Reading Beneath the Numbers

In the wake of the decision to allow the seizing of steroid test results by the FBI, whispers have arisen as to which players will be found upon the list of the supposed 100 who were found guilty of steroid use. Like the testimony of Jason Grimsley, this information will eventually be leaked so that judgment may be passed by angered and heartbroken fans alike. Unlike the names revealed by Grimsley—which have somehow been swept underneath the rug as if his words were never spoken or put upon paper—these findings are non-debatable. These test results provide hard evidence—substantial proof—that these players in fact cheated.

While many writers feel uneasy labeling various players as steroid users despite blatant signs that the players were undoubtedly using some variety of performance enhancing substance(s), these findings will quell their doubt. While these results are only from the 2003 testing period, and therefore cannot be used to identify culprits from the beginnings of the “steroid era”, they provide a fingerprint as to the source and direction of steroids throughout baseball. This evidence will not only solidify the cases against those upon the list, but create additional circumstantial evidence against ballplayers associated with those caught cheating.

You will not see Mark McGwire on the list—he had retired two years earlier—though names like Sosa, Giambi, and Sheffield are real possibilities. Still, if these names are not found amongst the 100, how will the public react? I fear that people will falsely believe that the absence of evidence is evidence of absence, and therefore find it even harder to accuse those that have clearly been deceiving us.

It’s naïve of people to turn their heads the other way and ignore the mounds of circumstantial evidence surrounding not only these players, but many others. This idea that if we put the steroid label upon McGwire we must put other greats like Maddux and Gwynn under the scope is absurd. While I do not believe that every player who rose to fame or excelled during the steroid era is guilty of using illegal substances—true it wasn’t explicitly illegal back then but does that mean you wouldn’t frown upon my shooting of someone in the leg in international waters just because there are no laws against it—there are ways of differentiating between possible cheaters and those who were simply great athletes.

It would be too easy and far too foolhardy to believe that every player between the mid-90’s and today who had sudden emergence of skill—one that either didn’t fit the development curve of a normal player or one that exceeded the perceived bounds of improvement over the off-season—were using some form of steroids. To ask every player to validate their newfound success—akin to asking for an alibi—would be scrupulous and unnecessary. The cops do not interrogate every person living within a one-mile radius of a crime scene, but when coincidences pile up, questions must be asked.

What happens when accusations from former or current teammates coincide with distorted numbers? Can we not then at least find some reason to consider the possibility that this player may be in fact cheating? Our country does insist that all are innocent until proven guilty and I am not opposing such a tradition. Yet, there is a threshold beyond which a player should have to for answer growing concerns, suspicions, and evidence that indicate that the player is in fact using illegal substances.

So what would be the procedure for conducting such testing? My own suspicions arise when there is both testimony and corroborating statistical evidence that support a player’s usage, yet these criteria could be problematic. Players could simply begin pointing fingers at those who had irregular statistical performances and thereby turn the players union into colossal free-for-all wherein everyone feels obligated to accuse another in order to protect their own credibility.

Still, I hold my own inklings regarding various players in Major League Baseball. Though I would by no means call these men criminals, I eagerly await evidence to support or nullify my growing suspicions. I will withhold the names for now, but will follow this passage up with another article regarding possible the usage of steroids in a particular team’s clubhouse in recent years.

As always, I would suggest keeping an open mind regarding steroids in Major League Baseball. Though it may feel as if players like Rafael Palmeiro—a man once loved for the consistent effort and air of respectability that he brought to the game—are unfairly turned into pariahs, compare this treatment to that of steroid users in the National Football League.

While writing this article I witnessed the words “great player” uttered with respect to Shawne Merriman, a confirmed steroid user in the NFL. His treatment compared to those found guilty in the Major League Baseball is cause for great concern and will undoubtedly be addressed in the near future by either myself or co-writer Jeremiah.

The State of Baseball in Chicago

The Cubs and White Sox are repairing their organizations after each had disappointing seasons in 2006. Despite sharing one of the largest media markets, neither has been able to harness the advantages associated with playing in a major metropolis. This off-season though, the Cubs are trying to break their tradition of watching the other large market teams (i.e.: Yankees, Red Sox, Dodgers) monopolize the free agent and trading markets. The Cubs have spent an incredibly large sum of money in hopes of capturing a division title while their southern brethren have taken a far different approach.

The Cubs have signed five new free agents and have renegotiated contracts for four players already on their roster. The largest contract handed out by the White Sox this off-season, other than the exercising of their team options on Mark Buerhle and Jermaine Dye, was a two-year deal to backup catcher Toby Hall. Instead of handing out the big bucks, the Sox have actually been dealing several pieces of their pitching staff in an attempt to not only shed a little payroll, but to get a little younger as well.

Here's a breakdown of the moves made by each of the Chicago-based teams and how these decisions should play out over the course of the 2007 season and beyond:

Chicago Cubs:
Alfonso Soriano ($16 million/year for 8 years) – There's no doubt that the newest member of the illustrious yet tainted 40-40 club is a joy to watch and is unlike any player on the field today. Still, his unique skill set is what leads to his downfall as a player and detracts from his overall worth. We are all aware of his defensive inefficiencies, but his ability to compensate at the plate is dulled when playing in the National League. If you bat him in the heart of the order his batting average—in his career performances—drops by more than 20 points. The more troubling problem is then that you lose the ability to properly capitalize on his speed now that he is lumped behind slower runners. Yet if he bats first, he fails to adequately get on base a sufficient number of times to make him a “great” leadoff man (note that he did in fact double season walk total in Washington this past season; it’ll be interesting to see if he can maintain this improved walking rate while lowering his strikeout rate back down to his already high average). The other qualm with leading him off is that in the National League, he often is forced to bat with the bases empty, in a non-critical situation where he can’t drive in runs. Nearly 2/3 of his home runs came with no one on base, preventing him from recording 100 RBI’s despite having more than 40 home runs and 40 doubles. These factors make him far less valuable than one would initially believe by skimming his statistics. While the $16 million per year may be a daunting figure, the scarier thought is that Soriano will be 38 during the final year of this nearly decade-long deal. Soriano will certainly be sold as the new centerpiece of this franchise, but how long will it be before the Cubs fans turn on him as quickly as they did on Sammy Sosa for not living up to their monumental expectations.

Ted Lilly ($10 million/year for 4 years) – A decent #4 starter who’s been just good enough to avoid being called a disappointment. Expect his ERA and WHIP to drop now that he’ll be escaping the most ferocious division for pitchers and entering the comforts of the National League. Still be weary of his home run totals, Lilly is a flyball pitcher who may be hurt by the friendly and often windy confines of Wrigley Field. All in all, the signing was a smart one for the Cubs, seeing as they need a starter other than Zambrano to give them 25+ starts (something Lilly’s done in all of his previous four seasons).

Jason Marquis ($7 million/year for 3 years) – Seven million dollars a year for a guy who couldn’t make the postseason rotation for a team that had only two starters with an ERA under 4.20?

Mark Derosa ($4.3 million/year for 3 years) – The guy did hit .296 with 40 doubles and can play an array of positions. This is the same guy who strikes out twice as often as he walks, is 32, and is a below-average fielder at nearly all the positions he plays.

Aramis Ramirez (Resigned for $14.6 million/year for 5 years) – Has greatly improved his bat control since arriving from Pittsburgh and his numbers reflect it. Just 28 years old and could easily improve those numbers with the return of Lee and addition Soriano to the lineup.

Chicago White Sox:
Mark Buerhle and Jermaine Dye options ($9.5 and $6.75 million respectively) – Buerhle barely evaded a 5.00 ERA last year but the five previous seasons all point to his ability to rebound. At $9.5 million Buerhle is bargain for a guy who has been one of the most consistent and reliable starters in the AL. Dye, the comeback story of the year, may not be able to reproduce his stunning numbers of 2006 but at his price even a drop off to .280-30-100 would still make him a cheap sign considering the current market.

Freddy Garcia dealt for Gavin Floyd and Gio Gonzalez – One of the best deals this summer in that it solved problems for both sides. The White Sox, loaded with middle of the rotation quality starters, could afford to gamble on young arms while the Phillies needed a veteran starter to anchor their young staff. Gavin Floyd has been hyped since being drafted as the #4 overall pick in 2001, but hasn’t yet lived up to it. His problems have supposedly been more mental than physical and it will prove interesting to see how the White Sox’s unorthodox clubhouse accommodates the young gun. Ken Williams didn’t bank the trade’s worth solely on Floyd’s success, he smartly acquired Gio Gonzalez. A good Double-A prospect who’s only limiting factor may be his erratic control—a skill easily improved as he matures through the system (he’s still just 21). Still, I’m surprised to see the White Sox give up such a quality arm for two inconsistent prospects.

Brandon McCarthy to Rangers – A deal that caught the entire baseball world off-guard given Ken Williams’ high demands for one of the more highly touted pitching arms. Confident that they’d have a sufficient number of players to fill the current rotation, Williams once again went for a younger crowd. The deal didn’t net the Sox a whole lot and considering the number of teams interested in McCarthy, you wonder if they could have negotiated for more. John Danks is a top-tier prospect and could fit into the rotation—if there’s any room—midway through 2007, turning all the other White Sox starters into enticing trade bait come late July should they need to fill various holes in their squad. Nick Masset is a good pitcher who will be able to provide bullpen depth and the other pitcher acquired by the White Sox Jacob Rasner is a useless player who is struggling mightily in Single-A. Still the White Sox had to give up Venezuelan outfielder David Paisano, who tore through rookie ball and just turned 19 a month ago. If his frame ever fills out (just 165lbs despite being 6’1”) he may add some pop to his bat and turn himself into a quality prospect. I see Danks and McCarthy on the same skill level, just on different platforms in their age development so the deal essentially boils down to Masset for Paisano, which benefits the Sox but not by an incredible margin.

Cubs & Sox:
Neal Cotts for David Aardsma and Carloz Vasquez – Cotts regressed back to the hard throwing yet hittable relief pitcher in 2006 and I’d be surprised if he were able to summon his dominance again. Aardsma may have been a disappointment considering he was a 1st-round pick back in the day, but he held batters to a .214 batting average last season in his stint as a reliever for the Cubs. His sudden success at the age of 25 may prove to be a fluke, but he’s certainly a better bet then Cotts. In addition the White Sox acquired Vasquez, who should make the Triple-A squad next season and despite being 25 as well will give the Sox yet another option for bullpen help. The Sox pulled a fast one here, getting two pitchers for the price of one—that one being more inconsistent and eligible for arbitration far sooner than the other two.


All things considered, you wonder how two franchises—even given that they finished in starkly different positions—could still take such drastically different approaches to improving their squads.

The White Sox are in a good position to rebound and contend in the newer, tougher AL Central. They’re clearly planning to remain competitive not only in 2007, but beyond; yet considering the hoard of pitching they had stashed the Sox kept their objectives conservative. Rather than furbish their farm system with a collection of high-quality prospects, Williams opted to merely restock their ailing bullpen.

Jim Hendry, general manager of the Chicago Cubs, has clearly anticipated the need to surround new coach Piniella with high-caliber players but may have sacrificed his team’s financial future in the process. I would hope that these recent acquisitions are in no way related to the Tribune Co. possibly looking to sell the team—which would warrant the purchasing of top-tier players in order to raise the franchise’s value since a new stadium (the best way to improve a team’s overall value) is out of the question. Still, this team’s success on the field relies on the healing bodies of Prior, Lee, and Wood and should they not come through, this franchise may be in for a long series of disappointing seasons.


Statistics and other relevant information for this article were found at mlb.com, milb.com, and baseball-reference.com.

Steroids in Baseball

Maybe I'm expecting too much from ESPN, but do they have to keep printing articles where the sole point is to make ridiculous arguments and rub people the wrong way? I have a problem with a lot of ESPN opinion columns, where the authors have no fear of having to craft arguments that stand up to any kind of scrutiny, and thus can espouse any belief they want without any kind of evidence.
I'm prompted to write this post thanks to the latest column by Gene Wojciechowski, which is nothing short of atrocious. The set-up is his own "GNC/Balco" wing of the Hall of Fame. At first glance, it doesn't seem like you should take it seriously. But as the dialogue progresses, Wojciechowski unfurls his prejudice in great glory. It becomes clear that he truly despises Mark McGwire, Sammy Sosa, Rafael Palmeiro, and Barry Bonds. And in venting this hatred, he at times becomes downright mean. This is what he wishes for Sammy Sosa: “Spent remaining years of life staring at silent cell phone.” This is what he wishes for Barry Bonds: “Bonds and his legal team insisted that the 28 dingers he hit at the rec yard of the Lompoc Federal Correctional Complex should count toward the record” For McGwire, he paints a fairy tale picture of a world where in seven years McGwire goes from a wash-out who hits .201 with 22 home runs to a 70 home run season thanks to the steroids he was using and no one else (besides Sammy Sosa) must have been taking. Funny how to make a point, Wojciechowski neglects to point out that in the 4 seasons before his admittedly miserable 1991 season, McGwire hit 49, 32, 33, and 39 home runs, and in the season after, he hit 42. Rafael Palmeiro gets what Wojciechowski probably sees as the ultimate insult, a comparison to Bill Clinton!
After reading this article, I'm left wondering why Wojciechowski hates these four men so much. I've noticed the lack of contempt from columnists over the numerous players who have been caught in the last year or so taking steroids. Who was the one player to get spat upon? Rafael Palmeiro. Why? Because he had the misfortune of being a superstar. In the NFL, Shawne Merriman was caught and suspended for four games for testing positive for steroids. Nonetheless, the hype machine is still going strong for Merriman, who some think should win Defensive Player of the Year. It seems even the star players in the NFL are forgiven with the blink of an eye.
What it comes down to for baseball writers, I think, is the sense of being fooled, and the perceived sacredness of the MLB Hall of Fame. There is a natural feeling of outrage that arises when it appears that the record-setting home run seasons of McGwire, Sosa, and Bonds were nothing more than a sham. This feeling becomes multiplied with the fear that they may tarnish the sacred shrine of baseball, the Hall of Fame. Yet, under the current system in the MLB, had any one of them tested positive during this run, they would have been subject to nothing more than a 50-game suspension. After all the hubbub about steroids, these are the rules that MLB has set for itself. The way these four men are treated in the media, it is as if they should be permanently banned from baseball. For what, not getting caught before they hit 60+ home runs? The only reason Gene Wojciechowski hates these men is because they happened to be the one who set records, who achieved great fame and fortune. Dozens of other players used steroids, but for most, none will ever care or know, besides themselves. Should these four men be in the Hall of Fame? I would say not. But do they deserve to be spat upon for having had the misfortune to excel unlike numerous other cheaters? I would also say not.