A's Deal Haren for Stong Package of Prospects

After the Twins couldn't find a suitor that fit, the A's dealt Haren for a bucket of young players. The D-Backs made a great trade partner, having an incredibly deep farm system capable of attracting the A's attention and while Arizona payed a high but fair price, they could certainly afford it. Haren makes for one of the best #2 starters in the game and will give the D-Backs a fierce 1-2 punch reminiscent of Schilling and Johnson. As always, let's take a look at each of the players involved in this deal...

Arizona's take:
Dan Haren - Top tier pitcher who has been eating innings for three years straight. His home run totals are a little worrisome but the switch to the weaker league and one of the worst hitting divisions should keep his numbers around what they were last year.

Connor Robertson - A potential bullpen piece who had dominated minors until he struggled in AAA last year. He's 25 and probably won't get much better, but Robertson is certainly capable of finding a role in Arizona's bullpen if he bounces back well.

Oakland's take:
Dana Eveland - Don't be fooled by the effeminate name, Eveland's a big lefty who could easily be in Oakland's rotation to start the season. Injuries hampered him a bit last year but still maintained a sub-2.00 ERA in AAA last year. Eveland's got strong stuff but he has yet to translate it to the major leagues, getting hammered in multiple stints with the D-Backs and Brewers. Overcoming some weight problems may give him the boost to break into Oakland's rotation this spring.

Greg Smith - A moderate lefty who is ready to make the jumps to the majors. He needs a decent third-pitch behind his quality fastball and curveball, the development of which should allow him to warrant a spot in the back-end of the A's staff.

Aaron Cunningham - A Melky Cabrera-esque prospect who can play all three outfield spots and hits for average, a little power, and can run. Cunningham's not as strong defensively as Cabrera and he'll be 22 when he starts the year in AA or AAA, but he's a top-notch utility outfielder. It's unlikely that he'll be able to maintain his power numbers in the majors but his speed and good average should keep in the pros.

Carlos Gonzalez - Gonzalez was yet another top-quality outfield prospect in Arizona's system and with him being less than a year away from MLB ready it made sense to include him in this deal. Gonzalez hits for average, power, has a cannon of an arm in right and was ranked as the 23rd best prospect by MILB (though a lot of that ranking was based on ceiling rather than performance). Gonzalez will definitely be spending some amount of time in the majors in 2008, it's just a matter of how hot of start he gets in AAA.

Brett Anderson - The 6'4" southpaw put up impressive numbers out of high school in A. He's had some injuries and there have been concerns about his pitching motion but despite these minor issues Anderson has a lot of potential at the tender age of 19.

Chris Carter - The D-Backs ship of Carter after acquiring from the White Sox in the Carlos Quentin deal. Carter is a poor defensive first-baseman who mashed his way through A-ball last year with 25 home runs. He does hit for some average and walks fairly often to compliment his power, but it's his ability to hit the long ball that should eventually get him to the major league level.

All of the guys en route to Oakland are at least B-level prospects and while none of them make your mouth water, the A's got more than adequate value for Haren. I was always hoping the Yankees would make a play for Haren but given what Arizona offered the Yanks would've had to start with at least Horne, Marquez, and Jackson. The D-Backs, despite their massive out performance of their Pythagorean last year look in great shape to take the NL West again.

The Mitchell Report (Post-Release)

Grimsley's testimony was corroborated in all circumstances, making the evidence against those listed in my previous post sufficiently substantiated (at least in my eyes). I won't delve into the complications of how thorough the evidence is for each of the players (because that would be too lengthy) or just the ones considered important (because I feel that neglects the cases of those less prominent). Instead I think it's pertinent to discuss two major issues aroused by this report.

The first is the magnitude of the steroids problem. Names appeared on this list that few saw coming (Denny Neagle and Mo Vaughn both caught me off guard), but the cases against many of these players were built off of a select group of informants. Since a large portion of the evidence is in the form of testimony from players or trainers and because the Mitchell investigation only extracted information from a small number of these groups, the actual number of steroid users is undoubtedly much greater.

Three organizations had a predominantly large number of players using steroids: the Yankees in 2001 (Sheffield, Giambi, Pettitte, Clemens), the Dodgers in 2000 and 2001 (Brown, Gagne, Hundley), and the Orioles in 2003 (Tejada, Bigbie, Gibbons, Roberts). There are numerous other connections and trends one can find, but these stood out to me. Imagine however if the Mitchell investigation found evidence from a trainer on the Braves, the Red Sox, or the Cubs. It's highly probable that there are equally large number of players on other teams that were shooting up at the same time but have yet been exposed. This hypothesis in no way justifies what happened in all the other clubhouses but it makes you wonder if we're really seeing the entire scope of this problem.

The other controversial issue is whether or not to induct steroid users into the Hall of Fame (note: I'm going to use steroids as a term for all banned substances that are considered cheating, including HGH, for convenience). The new name obviously added to this controversial list is Roger Clemens. Here are the two arguments I have heard for why one should vote for Clemens or Bonds or any of the others in comparable situations:
1.) The player had accumulated a sufficiently impressive resume of statistics and awards before he began using steroids. By using steroids he did not surpass the boundary between HOF worthy and unworthy. Therefore the player should be admitted based on his merits before steroid use.
2.) It is impossible to judge how many players used steroids during this era and even more difficult to pinpoint which ones. Due to this difficulty, one cannot deny a player's entry without denying all of the players from this era unless we have absolute proof of their cheating (ie: positive test).

Both of these arguments fail to neglect the moral issues associated with the Hall of Fame in different ways. The first effectively chooses to ignore what a player does after he has reached HOF status. To paraphrase the argument, "a player reaches a certain statistical pedestal than he is absolved of any and all infractions or misdeeds that he may do following the reaching of this mark". When you put a player's plaque on the wall in Cooperstown you can't choose to acknowledge and ignore specified portions of that player's career. This decision sends a message to children that it is alright to use steroids if certain qualifications and circumstances are met.

The second argument is flawed in that it chooses to be selectively naive. By refusing to believe multiple corroborating and independent testimonies against a certain individual one is being very demanding as to what constitutes sufficient proof of cheating. However, when they claim that they cannot consider this person's merits altered based on the presumption that others were likely using too than one is being overly presumptuous based on minimal evidence. Furthermore, the whole conception of judging a player based on the actions of other players is absurd and doesn't acknowledge the consequences of electing a likely steroid user into the Hall of Fame (I'll address the issue of "likely" later on).

One's decision to elect a worthy player to the Hall of Fame who should be dictated by a single belief: whether or not the voter believes the player used steroids. If the voter believes that player used steroids, under any circumstance, he should not vote the player into the Hall of Fame because he violated the rules of the game and by electing him it portrays steroid use in as acceptable to people of all ages. Cheating is not excusable under any circumstances. If the voter believes with all certainty that the player never cheated, than by all means he/she should vote for him.

Herein lies the flaw with the voting system. If one is unsure, they should choose to abstain and thereby require that player to get the necessary percentage of votes from the remaining individuals but not count that particular voter in their percentage calculation. I understand that this description is quite complicated so think of the situation as follows: There are 300 voters and I abstain for one player, than for that player instead of needing say 75% of 300 votes, he needs 75% of 299 votes. Those voters who think it's "likely" the player cheated but are not sufficiently persuaded should take this course of action.

People may not like the idea of turning the Hall of Fame vote into a jury trial but that's what steroids have forced upon us. In a jury one would not declare a person's innocence or guilt without being absolutely confident in one's decision. I will withhold my own beliefs regarding specific players because that is irrelevant here. What is important is that the voters consider the facts in the most objective and comprehensive way possible and make their decisions according to these principles in line with how one would normally vote in terms of deciding a person's guilt.

Tejada, Rowand, and Fukudome

If you were getting bored with the lack of action this baseball off-season then you should get your web browser open cause players are moving all across the country. Let's do a quick synopsis of what transpired to today and what teams came out on top.

Aaron Rowand signs with Giants - Jones got $18.1 million per year, Hunter got $18 million, and the Giants somehow corralled Rowand with a five year deal at $12 million a pop. Rowand's offensive performance has been inconsistent over the last four years but as long as he's hitting at his career average of .286/.343/.462 and plays quality defense in the center this contract is of good value. Rowand plays hard and you wonder if his body will hold up through the end of this contract when Rowand will 35. Despite this fact, Rowand's a great leader and hustle player that you want in your clubhouse.

Kosuke Fukudome signs with Cubs - Fukudome's ability to hit for average, moderate power, and quality eye make him a great signing for the Cubs. Keith Law keenly pointed to Fukudome's likeness to Bobby Abreu and at the age of 30, the Japanese import should put up .290/.380/.460 type numbers.


Miguel Tejada for Scott, Patton, Albers, Sarfate, and Costanzo - For what the Astros gave up to get Tejada this trade would've been a pretty good deal, if the Astros had a flourishing farm system and if the Astros were in any sort of contention for a playoff spot. But neither of those if's are true. Luke Scott's a fourth outfielder who at the age of 29 probably won't put up numbers like he did in his half year stint in 2006. Matt Albers is a mediocre starter in AAA who could fill in as an emergency starter but that's about it. Troy Patton is a quality young starting pitcher capable of being a #4 starter or even better if he can get his strikeout rate back up. Dennis Sarfate is a hopeless 26 year old reliever with no control. Michael Costanzo's a power hitting third baseman but has way too many swings and misses with below average fielding ability.

Other than Patton, there's not much value in this package going back to Baltimore. Still, the Astros have no need for another aging bat considering they already have Lee and Berkman and only have one decent starting pitcher. These barely B-level prospects are also pretty much all Houston had left in their farm system, thus robbing them of the chance to rebuild after Tejada's contract expires in two years. As for the Orioles, I think they could've gotten better value but at least they've finally decided to shut it all down and start fresh, something they've needed to do for nearly a decade.

The Mitchell Report (Pre-Release)

The essential purpose of this post is to allow me to say "I told you [insert name here] was using steroids" to everyone I know. While I hold this opinions strongly take into account that the beliefs disclosed in this article are based on previous data and testimony and in no way represent condemning evidence proving these players' guilt.

That being said, whose names can we possibly expect to see in the Mitchell Report?

To start: Brian Roberts, Jay Gibbons, Miguel Tejada and additional players from the 2004 Baltimore Orioles. This team has the unique distinction of having three confirmed steroid users for an entire season: Rafael Palmeiro, David Segui, and Jason Grimsley. Additionally, Grimsley explicitly named Roberts, Gibbons, and Tejada in his interrogation with federal investigators. There are major statistical anomalies in Roberts' career including his slugging percentage jumping 139 points from 2004 to 2005 and his hitting as many home runs in his first 295 at-bats in 2005 as he had in his previous 1502 at-bats before the 2005 season. While the other two players don't have such eye-raising discrepancies in their performances, I see no reason why Grimsley would have motivation to falsely accuse his former teammates.

Given the high degree of usage within this clubhouse it also wouldn't surprise me to see other players from this team listed. Javy Lopez and Melvin Mora are suspicions of mine given abnormally strong seasons during their stint with Orioles in this time period. Mora went from a career .249/.320/.388 hitter in 1438 at-bats to .331/.407/.539 hitter from 2004-2005 at the not so youthful age of 31. Lopez hit a miraculous 43 home runs (having hit 25 HRs or more only once before in his career) at the age of 32 for the Braves before coming to the Orioles the following year. Lopez' slugging percentage in his last season was 164 points higher than his previous career high.

As we saw with Palmeiro though, steroid use can alter performance in other facets or not at all. A high number of low-key players are likely to be exposed in the report; players who were barely making the cut and resorted to steroids but failed to improve significantly. Others may have prolonged their careers without substantially heightening their skills. This type of usage to extend one's career is suspected by a minority of fans--including myself--to have been exhibited by Roger Clemens.

The belief is that there is a conspiracy behind Clemens' delayed start to the 2006 season and was not due to his questioning retirement. Rather, some believe there was 50-day steroid suspension kept quiet by Major League Baseball. Clemens did sign his contract with the Astros 54 games into their season and if he had been caught, MLB could ill afford to allow such news to be leaked considering Clemens' near immortal status. This theory is based purely on speculation and coincidences that merely lack satisfying explanations (much like Jordan's departure from basketball after in 1993).

Stronger evidence lies in Clemens' remarkable ability to remain competitive at such an old age. His Cy Young worthy seasons from 2004-2006 may be attributable to his incredible work ethic, his relocation to the weakest division in baseball, or possibly cheating via steroids. The final corroborating fact however lies once again in the testimony of Jason Grimsley, who named Clemens in his report. Collectively, the circumstantial evidence and Grimsley's statement make for a compelling case for Clemens' steroid use.

I'm not calling for the damning of these players but merely voicing my speculations as to what I expect from the Mitchell Report on Thursday. Chances are there will few, if any, major players (pun not intended) exposed, but the report may very well provide a trail of drug usage across the league. The release of these names will hopefully give the public an idea of just how rampant this problem was and still is today.

Consistency and other interesting tid-bits...

I recently began reading the Hardball Times again and immediately found it rewarding. Here's a great piece by Sal Baxamusa on run scoring consistency.

For those of you without the stomach to endure the entirety of the statistically heavy article, it essentially breaks down the distribution of how runs are scored on a per game basis. A more powerful offense is not necessarily more consistent than a weak one, but a more consistent scoring pattern is beneficial regardless of how many runs you are scoring. Though this distribution of runs is often uncontrollable, it's interesting to see how the teams fared in the 2007 season.

One of the lesser focuses of this article, but is mentioned briefly, is the marginal utility of runs scored. The first graph depicts how useful each additional run is towards improving a team's overall record. Optimizing one's offense in accordance with this trend would potentially allow a team to maximize its winning percentage. I'm in the process of reforming and old data set to explore this possibility and will post in the coming days about the strategies that could be potentially derived from these trends.

Playoffs??!

Why is the NCAA still taking advice from Jim Mora, Sr.?



But seriously, the idea that we can determine the national champion this way is a joke. Now we should thank the BCS for the Texas-USC matchup of 2005; without the BCS, USC would have been relegated to a Rose Bowl match with Ohio State and would likely still be hailed by ESPN as the 'greatest team of all time.' In general, though, I would argue that we might as well go back to the old way of doing things and admit that there is no true national champion in college football. There's nothing wrong with that, besides the lack of intrigue. What we have now is a half-assed compromise, and one that most years, fails to meet its goal.

Of course, there is the other alternative - a 16-team playoff. I'm not going to spend a lot of time here arguing for it, but I will say that if the NCAA and the college presidents wanted to do it, they could. I believe solutions can be worked out (and have been) to many of the commonly mentioned problems. I once conceived of an 8-team playoff but this of course would be just as unfair to the smaller conferences as the current system. Therefore, an equitable 16-team playoff: 11 conference champions and 5 at-large berths.

So what would this bracket look like*?

1st round:

1. Ohio State - BIG 10 CHAMPION vs. 16. Florida Atlantic - SUN BELT CHAMPION
8. Kansas - At-Large vs. 9. West Virginia - BIG EAST CHAMPION
5. Georgia - At-Large vs. 12. Arizona State - At-Large
4. Oklahoma - BIG 12 CHAMPION vs. 13. BYU - MOUNTAIN WEST CHAMPION
6. Missouri - At-Large vs. 11. Florida - At-Large
3. Virginia Tech - ACC CHAMPION vs. 14. UCF - CONFERENCE USA CHAMPION
7. USC - PAC-10 CHAMPION vs. 10. Hawaii - WAC CHAMPION
2. LSU - SEC CHAMPION vs. 15. Central Michigan - MAC CHAMPION

Tons of great games in this bracket. A first-round match of Missouri vs. Florida. A potential Georgia vs. Oklahoma bout in round 2, with the winner perhaps facing Ohio State. USC-LSU in round 2, and a potential LSU-Virginia Tech re-match in the semifinal. Powerful mid-majors like Hawaii and BYU would get legitimate chances to spring upsets and Ohio State and LSU would be rewarded for great seasons (sorry Florida Atlantic and Central Michigan). Purely from the perspective of watching games, this bracket makes me salivate. I like the bowls, but they don't make me feel that giddy rush of excitement that I feel during March Madness.

And yes, the Illini are the last team out. Sigh.

*The bracket is constructed by ranking the teams according to where they stand in the BCS Rankings - the one exception being that Florida and Arizona State are switched to avoid an all-SEC Georgia-Florida match in Round 1. The ordering of teams 14-16 was at my discretion, but I don't think anyone would argue too much.

Breaking Down the Mega-Deal

The MLB off-season has had only one significant deal so far so let's take a look at what went down. For those not hitting the refresh tab of espn.com every 10 seconds, here are the players that were swapped:

Tigers receive: Miguel Cabrera, Dontrelle Willis
Marlins receive: Andrew Miller, Cameron Maybin, Mike Rabelo, Eulogio De la Cruz, Dallas Trahern, Burke Badenhop

Some of these name may be unfamiliar so a player by player breakdown would be nice to get an accurate sense of the value being exchanged.

Miguel Cabrera - One of the best hitters in the game at the youthful age of 24; probably one of the most coveted offensive weapons in the game.

Dontrelle Willis - Willis was considered a #1 starter in 2005 but since then has plummeted to the level of bottom of the rotation role on an AL squad. His WHIP continues to increase, his strikeout rate continues to fall, and his splits are becoming increasingly troubling. Over Willis' career right-handed batters are hitting .278 while lefties only .202, but last year those numbers spread further to .320 and .123 respectively. Statistically savvy managers can stack their lineups against Willis to take advantage of his weakness against righties. Chances of him rebounding are possible given his age, but the complexity of his windup and his moving to the better league present severe obstacles.

Andrew Miller - Miller is a top-notch pitching prospect who excelled in his 2007 stints in the minors. Miller had no business being in the majors last year, he tore up AA but struggled in his two AAA starts and had less than a year's experience in the Tigers' system. Despite his difficulties at the major league level, he still projects as a mid-to-front end of the rotation starter who is probably a year away from being an impact player.

Cameron Maybin - Maybin had played in six AA games when the Tigers gave him the starting job after they gave Craig Monroe to the Cubs. Another highly talented player who's still raw, Maybin has five tools that should be on display two years down the road. To say the Tigers rushed him through the system is an understatement; his value will grow tremendously if given the time to learn the ropes in the minors.

Mike Rabelo - A cheap backup quality catcher with experience working with young arms.

Eulogio De la Cruz - A fireballer who's worked both as a starter and a reliever. He's erratic and lacks a strong secondary pitch but still has a good shot of finding a role as a 7th-inning reliever or even a setup man.

Dallas Trahern - A mediocre sinkerballer who doesn't get a whole lot of strikeouts but keeps the ball on the ground. Chien-Ming Wang is perfecting the art of the one-pitch sinkerballer and while Trahern is not near Wang's quality, the development of a secondary pitch should let him sneak into the rotation at some point.

Burke Badenhop - Badenhop has dominated A ball and made three impressive starts in AA last year but at the age of 24 and a fastball that barely hits 91 mph his chances are limited. He's still been pitching as a starter, so the conversion to a reliever may allow for him to crack a major league roster eventually.

The Marlins got good value for Miggy and Willis: Two A-quality prospects, two B-quality prospects, a backup catcher, and an additional minor league arm. Presuming the Marlins are patient with Miller and Maybin, they should get a strong return on their investment.

The Tigers now hold one of the most potent offenses in the majors but are taking a big risk on Willis. While Cabrera's and Willis' ages make this deal not a simple future-for-present success swap, it's clear this organization is going to do all it can to win with its current crew--especially after their embarrassing loss in the World Series two years ago.

I'd feel comfortable making this deal from either end, though I think given Willis' level of risk, I would've preferred to have made this deal without having to give up more to include him. Then again, the Marlins may very well have been offering him at a discount rate given the growing speculations about his abilities. The Tigers immediately become a power-house in the AL while the Marlins have set themselves up for another World Series run two or three years down the road.

Dodgers Waste $ Again

Hey, readers. We're back again after a long extended absence. Jeremiah and I are gonna try and be more casual with our posts and post more often. Additionally we want you guys to contribute too. Please feel free to comment on anything in the posts or introduce something totally different.

That being said... the Dodgers organization just got hosed. For the second time in the past three years the Dodgers overpaid for a player that they didn't even need. The Dodgers took enough flak for the Pierre signing (so we'll spare them any more), but the Jones' one may be worse.

Let's first address why Andruw Jones doesn't deserve $18 million. He may only be 30 years old, but he's well beyond his hitting prime. Jones' is an all-or-nothing hitter who consistently strikeouts over 120 times and fails to maintain a decent average. He's a career .263 hitter who doesn't draw walks to compensate for his strikeouts (only once in the last five seasons has he eclipsed a .350 OBP) and hasn't been a threat on the bases for over half a decade. His pitiful .222/.311/.413 season is reminiscent of Jeromy Burnitz' despicable 2002 season for the Mets (.215/.311/.365).

While some may balk and my comparison of these two outfielders, their hitting styles and career paths are very much aligned (Burnitz hit rock bottom at age 33, Jones at 30). The swing-hard and hope for the best mentality quickly led to Burnitz' demise and casts a bleak picture of Jones' offensive future.

Here's where someone feeds me the argument that Jones is an 11-time Gold Glove winner and an excellent outfielder. Jones' defensive prowess has been declining since 1999, to the point where he barely retains the title as an "above average" center fielder. Check his Runs above replacement or average players (RAR and RAA). Both have been dropping drastically since 1999, with Jones being the exact equivalent of an average center fielder in 2006.

Defensive statistics are still highly debatable, but despite this qualm Jones fails to be worth $18 million a year.

The second major reason for why this signing is unwarranted is the Dodgers' proficient amount of young outfield talent. With Pierre now locked in center and Luis Gonzalez becoming a free agent, Andre Ethier and Matt Kemp were projected to be the two corner outfielders for the Dodgers. Each is still on their basic pre-arbitration contracts and each were productive in their sophomore seasons. Jones' presence will take more AB's away from these young hitters without adding any significant production beyond what Ethier and Kemp were providing. Unless the Dodgers are able to turn Ethier for some quality prospects or players (and even then, you're paying Jones $17.5 million more than you would be Ethier) this signing makes no sense given the team's depth chart.

Don't be surprised to see more overspending in the coming weeks. In certain circumstances, it's alright to overpay if your needs are great enough (ie: the White Sox' need for a CF), but in the Dodgers' case, this decision is just inexcusable.