A's Deal Haren for Stong Package of Prospects

After the Twins couldn't find a suitor that fit, the A's dealt Haren for a bucket of young players. The D-Backs made a great trade partner, having an incredibly deep farm system capable of attracting the A's attention and while Arizona payed a high but fair price, they could certainly afford it. Haren makes for one of the best #2 starters in the game and will give the D-Backs a fierce 1-2 punch reminiscent of Schilling and Johnson. As always, let's take a look at each of the players involved in this deal...

Arizona's take:
Dan Haren - Top tier pitcher who has been eating innings for three years straight. His home run totals are a little worrisome but the switch to the weaker league and one of the worst hitting divisions should keep his numbers around what they were last year.

Connor Robertson - A potential bullpen piece who had dominated minors until he struggled in AAA last year. He's 25 and probably won't get much better, but Robertson is certainly capable of finding a role in Arizona's bullpen if he bounces back well.

Oakland's take:
Dana Eveland - Don't be fooled by the effeminate name, Eveland's a big lefty who could easily be in Oakland's rotation to start the season. Injuries hampered him a bit last year but still maintained a sub-2.00 ERA in AAA last year. Eveland's got strong stuff but he has yet to translate it to the major leagues, getting hammered in multiple stints with the D-Backs and Brewers. Overcoming some weight problems may give him the boost to break into Oakland's rotation this spring.

Greg Smith - A moderate lefty who is ready to make the jumps to the majors. He needs a decent third-pitch behind his quality fastball and curveball, the development of which should allow him to warrant a spot in the back-end of the A's staff.

Aaron Cunningham - A Melky Cabrera-esque prospect who can play all three outfield spots and hits for average, a little power, and can run. Cunningham's not as strong defensively as Cabrera and he'll be 22 when he starts the year in AA or AAA, but he's a top-notch utility outfielder. It's unlikely that he'll be able to maintain his power numbers in the majors but his speed and good average should keep in the pros.

Carlos Gonzalez - Gonzalez was yet another top-quality outfield prospect in Arizona's system and with him being less than a year away from MLB ready it made sense to include him in this deal. Gonzalez hits for average, power, has a cannon of an arm in right and was ranked as the 23rd best prospect by MILB (though a lot of that ranking was based on ceiling rather than performance). Gonzalez will definitely be spending some amount of time in the majors in 2008, it's just a matter of how hot of start he gets in AAA.

Brett Anderson - The 6'4" southpaw put up impressive numbers out of high school in A. He's had some injuries and there have been concerns about his pitching motion but despite these minor issues Anderson has a lot of potential at the tender age of 19.

Chris Carter - The D-Backs ship of Carter after acquiring from the White Sox in the Carlos Quentin deal. Carter is a poor defensive first-baseman who mashed his way through A-ball last year with 25 home runs. He does hit for some average and walks fairly often to compliment his power, but it's his ability to hit the long ball that should eventually get him to the major league level.

All of the guys en route to Oakland are at least B-level prospects and while none of them make your mouth water, the A's got more than adequate value for Haren. I was always hoping the Yankees would make a play for Haren but given what Arizona offered the Yanks would've had to start with at least Horne, Marquez, and Jackson. The D-Backs, despite their massive out performance of their Pythagorean last year look in great shape to take the NL West again.

The Mitchell Report (Post-Release)

Grimsley's testimony was corroborated in all circumstances, making the evidence against those listed in my previous post sufficiently substantiated (at least in my eyes). I won't delve into the complications of how thorough the evidence is for each of the players (because that would be too lengthy) or just the ones considered important (because I feel that neglects the cases of those less prominent). Instead I think it's pertinent to discuss two major issues aroused by this report.

The first is the magnitude of the steroids problem. Names appeared on this list that few saw coming (Denny Neagle and Mo Vaughn both caught me off guard), but the cases against many of these players were built off of a select group of informants. Since a large portion of the evidence is in the form of testimony from players or trainers and because the Mitchell investigation only extracted information from a small number of these groups, the actual number of steroid users is undoubtedly much greater.

Three organizations had a predominantly large number of players using steroids: the Yankees in 2001 (Sheffield, Giambi, Pettitte, Clemens), the Dodgers in 2000 and 2001 (Brown, Gagne, Hundley), and the Orioles in 2003 (Tejada, Bigbie, Gibbons, Roberts). There are numerous other connections and trends one can find, but these stood out to me. Imagine however if the Mitchell investigation found evidence from a trainer on the Braves, the Red Sox, or the Cubs. It's highly probable that there are equally large number of players on other teams that were shooting up at the same time but have yet been exposed. This hypothesis in no way justifies what happened in all the other clubhouses but it makes you wonder if we're really seeing the entire scope of this problem.

The other controversial issue is whether or not to induct steroid users into the Hall of Fame (note: I'm going to use steroids as a term for all banned substances that are considered cheating, including HGH, for convenience). The new name obviously added to this controversial list is Roger Clemens. Here are the two arguments I have heard for why one should vote for Clemens or Bonds or any of the others in comparable situations:
1.) The player had accumulated a sufficiently impressive resume of statistics and awards before he began using steroids. By using steroids he did not surpass the boundary between HOF worthy and unworthy. Therefore the player should be admitted based on his merits before steroid use.
2.) It is impossible to judge how many players used steroids during this era and even more difficult to pinpoint which ones. Due to this difficulty, one cannot deny a player's entry without denying all of the players from this era unless we have absolute proof of their cheating (ie: positive test).

Both of these arguments fail to neglect the moral issues associated with the Hall of Fame in different ways. The first effectively chooses to ignore what a player does after he has reached HOF status. To paraphrase the argument, "a player reaches a certain statistical pedestal than he is absolved of any and all infractions or misdeeds that he may do following the reaching of this mark". When you put a player's plaque on the wall in Cooperstown you can't choose to acknowledge and ignore specified portions of that player's career. This decision sends a message to children that it is alright to use steroids if certain qualifications and circumstances are met.

The second argument is flawed in that it chooses to be selectively naive. By refusing to believe multiple corroborating and independent testimonies against a certain individual one is being very demanding as to what constitutes sufficient proof of cheating. However, when they claim that they cannot consider this person's merits altered based on the presumption that others were likely using too than one is being overly presumptuous based on minimal evidence. Furthermore, the whole conception of judging a player based on the actions of other players is absurd and doesn't acknowledge the consequences of electing a likely steroid user into the Hall of Fame (I'll address the issue of "likely" later on).

One's decision to elect a worthy player to the Hall of Fame who should be dictated by a single belief: whether or not the voter believes the player used steroids. If the voter believes that player used steroids, under any circumstance, he should not vote the player into the Hall of Fame because he violated the rules of the game and by electing him it portrays steroid use in as acceptable to people of all ages. Cheating is not excusable under any circumstances. If the voter believes with all certainty that the player never cheated, than by all means he/she should vote for him.

Herein lies the flaw with the voting system. If one is unsure, they should choose to abstain and thereby require that player to get the necessary percentage of votes from the remaining individuals but not count that particular voter in their percentage calculation. I understand that this description is quite complicated so think of the situation as follows: There are 300 voters and I abstain for one player, than for that player instead of needing say 75% of 300 votes, he needs 75% of 299 votes. Those voters who think it's "likely" the player cheated but are not sufficiently persuaded should take this course of action.

People may not like the idea of turning the Hall of Fame vote into a jury trial but that's what steroids have forced upon us. In a jury one would not declare a person's innocence or guilt without being absolutely confident in one's decision. I will withhold my own beliefs regarding specific players because that is irrelevant here. What is important is that the voters consider the facts in the most objective and comprehensive way possible and make their decisions according to these principles in line with how one would normally vote in terms of deciding a person's guilt.

Tejada, Rowand, and Fukudome

If you were getting bored with the lack of action this baseball off-season then you should get your web browser open cause players are moving all across the country. Let's do a quick synopsis of what transpired to today and what teams came out on top.

Aaron Rowand signs with Giants - Jones got $18.1 million per year, Hunter got $18 million, and the Giants somehow corralled Rowand with a five year deal at $12 million a pop. Rowand's offensive performance has been inconsistent over the last four years but as long as he's hitting at his career average of .286/.343/.462 and plays quality defense in the center this contract is of good value. Rowand plays hard and you wonder if his body will hold up through the end of this contract when Rowand will 35. Despite this fact, Rowand's a great leader and hustle player that you want in your clubhouse.

Kosuke Fukudome signs with Cubs - Fukudome's ability to hit for average, moderate power, and quality eye make him a great signing for the Cubs. Keith Law keenly pointed to Fukudome's likeness to Bobby Abreu and at the age of 30, the Japanese import should put up .290/.380/.460 type numbers.


Miguel Tejada for Scott, Patton, Albers, Sarfate, and Costanzo - For what the Astros gave up to get Tejada this trade would've been a pretty good deal, if the Astros had a flourishing farm system and if the Astros were in any sort of contention for a playoff spot. But neither of those if's are true. Luke Scott's a fourth outfielder who at the age of 29 probably won't put up numbers like he did in his half year stint in 2006. Matt Albers is a mediocre starter in AAA who could fill in as an emergency starter but that's about it. Troy Patton is a quality young starting pitcher capable of being a #4 starter or even better if he can get his strikeout rate back up. Dennis Sarfate is a hopeless 26 year old reliever with no control. Michael Costanzo's a power hitting third baseman but has way too many swings and misses with below average fielding ability.

Other than Patton, there's not much value in this package going back to Baltimore. Still, the Astros have no need for another aging bat considering they already have Lee and Berkman and only have one decent starting pitcher. These barely B-level prospects are also pretty much all Houston had left in their farm system, thus robbing them of the chance to rebuild after Tejada's contract expires in two years. As for the Orioles, I think they could've gotten better value but at least they've finally decided to shut it all down and start fresh, something they've needed to do for nearly a decade.

The Mitchell Report (Pre-Release)

The essential purpose of this post is to allow me to say "I told you [insert name here] was using steroids" to everyone I know. While I hold this opinions strongly take into account that the beliefs disclosed in this article are based on previous data and testimony and in no way represent condemning evidence proving these players' guilt.

That being said, whose names can we possibly expect to see in the Mitchell Report?

To start: Brian Roberts, Jay Gibbons, Miguel Tejada and additional players from the 2004 Baltimore Orioles. This team has the unique distinction of having three confirmed steroid users for an entire season: Rafael Palmeiro, David Segui, and Jason Grimsley. Additionally, Grimsley explicitly named Roberts, Gibbons, and Tejada in his interrogation with federal investigators. There are major statistical anomalies in Roberts' career including his slugging percentage jumping 139 points from 2004 to 2005 and his hitting as many home runs in his first 295 at-bats in 2005 as he had in his previous 1502 at-bats before the 2005 season. While the other two players don't have such eye-raising discrepancies in their performances, I see no reason why Grimsley would have motivation to falsely accuse his former teammates.

Given the high degree of usage within this clubhouse it also wouldn't surprise me to see other players from this team listed. Javy Lopez and Melvin Mora are suspicions of mine given abnormally strong seasons during their stint with Orioles in this time period. Mora went from a career .249/.320/.388 hitter in 1438 at-bats to .331/.407/.539 hitter from 2004-2005 at the not so youthful age of 31. Lopez hit a miraculous 43 home runs (having hit 25 HRs or more only once before in his career) at the age of 32 for the Braves before coming to the Orioles the following year. Lopez' slugging percentage in his last season was 164 points higher than his previous career high.

As we saw with Palmeiro though, steroid use can alter performance in other facets or not at all. A high number of low-key players are likely to be exposed in the report; players who were barely making the cut and resorted to steroids but failed to improve significantly. Others may have prolonged their careers without substantially heightening their skills. This type of usage to extend one's career is suspected by a minority of fans--including myself--to have been exhibited by Roger Clemens.

The belief is that there is a conspiracy behind Clemens' delayed start to the 2006 season and was not due to his questioning retirement. Rather, some believe there was 50-day steroid suspension kept quiet by Major League Baseball. Clemens did sign his contract with the Astros 54 games into their season and if he had been caught, MLB could ill afford to allow such news to be leaked considering Clemens' near immortal status. This theory is based purely on speculation and coincidences that merely lack satisfying explanations (much like Jordan's departure from basketball after in 1993).

Stronger evidence lies in Clemens' remarkable ability to remain competitive at such an old age. His Cy Young worthy seasons from 2004-2006 may be attributable to his incredible work ethic, his relocation to the weakest division in baseball, or possibly cheating via steroids. The final corroborating fact however lies once again in the testimony of Jason Grimsley, who named Clemens in his report. Collectively, the circumstantial evidence and Grimsley's statement make for a compelling case for Clemens' steroid use.

I'm not calling for the damning of these players but merely voicing my speculations as to what I expect from the Mitchell Report on Thursday. Chances are there will few, if any, major players (pun not intended) exposed, but the report may very well provide a trail of drug usage across the league. The release of these names will hopefully give the public an idea of just how rampant this problem was and still is today.

Consistency and other interesting tid-bits...

I recently began reading the Hardball Times again and immediately found it rewarding. Here's a great piece by Sal Baxamusa on run scoring consistency.

For those of you without the stomach to endure the entirety of the statistically heavy article, it essentially breaks down the distribution of how runs are scored on a per game basis. A more powerful offense is not necessarily more consistent than a weak one, but a more consistent scoring pattern is beneficial regardless of how many runs you are scoring. Though this distribution of runs is often uncontrollable, it's interesting to see how the teams fared in the 2007 season.

One of the lesser focuses of this article, but is mentioned briefly, is the marginal utility of runs scored. The first graph depicts how useful each additional run is towards improving a team's overall record. Optimizing one's offense in accordance with this trend would potentially allow a team to maximize its winning percentage. I'm in the process of reforming and old data set to explore this possibility and will post in the coming days about the strategies that could be potentially derived from these trends.

Playoffs??!

Why is the NCAA still taking advice from Jim Mora, Sr.?



But seriously, the idea that we can determine the national champion this way is a joke. Now we should thank the BCS for the Texas-USC matchup of 2005; without the BCS, USC would have been relegated to a Rose Bowl match with Ohio State and would likely still be hailed by ESPN as the 'greatest team of all time.' In general, though, I would argue that we might as well go back to the old way of doing things and admit that there is no true national champion in college football. There's nothing wrong with that, besides the lack of intrigue. What we have now is a half-assed compromise, and one that most years, fails to meet its goal.

Of course, there is the other alternative - a 16-team playoff. I'm not going to spend a lot of time here arguing for it, but I will say that if the NCAA and the college presidents wanted to do it, they could. I believe solutions can be worked out (and have been) to many of the commonly mentioned problems. I once conceived of an 8-team playoff but this of course would be just as unfair to the smaller conferences as the current system. Therefore, an equitable 16-team playoff: 11 conference champions and 5 at-large berths.

So what would this bracket look like*?

1st round:

1. Ohio State - BIG 10 CHAMPION vs. 16. Florida Atlantic - SUN BELT CHAMPION
8. Kansas - At-Large vs. 9. West Virginia - BIG EAST CHAMPION
5. Georgia - At-Large vs. 12. Arizona State - At-Large
4. Oklahoma - BIG 12 CHAMPION vs. 13. BYU - MOUNTAIN WEST CHAMPION
6. Missouri - At-Large vs. 11. Florida - At-Large
3. Virginia Tech - ACC CHAMPION vs. 14. UCF - CONFERENCE USA CHAMPION
7. USC - PAC-10 CHAMPION vs. 10. Hawaii - WAC CHAMPION
2. LSU - SEC CHAMPION vs. 15. Central Michigan - MAC CHAMPION

Tons of great games in this bracket. A first-round match of Missouri vs. Florida. A potential Georgia vs. Oklahoma bout in round 2, with the winner perhaps facing Ohio State. USC-LSU in round 2, and a potential LSU-Virginia Tech re-match in the semifinal. Powerful mid-majors like Hawaii and BYU would get legitimate chances to spring upsets and Ohio State and LSU would be rewarded for great seasons (sorry Florida Atlantic and Central Michigan). Purely from the perspective of watching games, this bracket makes me salivate. I like the bowls, but they don't make me feel that giddy rush of excitement that I feel during March Madness.

And yes, the Illini are the last team out. Sigh.

*The bracket is constructed by ranking the teams according to where they stand in the BCS Rankings - the one exception being that Florida and Arizona State are switched to avoid an all-SEC Georgia-Florida match in Round 1. The ordering of teams 14-16 was at my discretion, but I don't think anyone would argue too much.

Breaking Down the Mega-Deal

The MLB off-season has had only one significant deal so far so let's take a look at what went down. For those not hitting the refresh tab of espn.com every 10 seconds, here are the players that were swapped:

Tigers receive: Miguel Cabrera, Dontrelle Willis
Marlins receive: Andrew Miller, Cameron Maybin, Mike Rabelo, Eulogio De la Cruz, Dallas Trahern, Burke Badenhop

Some of these name may be unfamiliar so a player by player breakdown would be nice to get an accurate sense of the value being exchanged.

Miguel Cabrera - One of the best hitters in the game at the youthful age of 24; probably one of the most coveted offensive weapons in the game.

Dontrelle Willis - Willis was considered a #1 starter in 2005 but since then has plummeted to the level of bottom of the rotation role on an AL squad. His WHIP continues to increase, his strikeout rate continues to fall, and his splits are becoming increasingly troubling. Over Willis' career right-handed batters are hitting .278 while lefties only .202, but last year those numbers spread further to .320 and .123 respectively. Statistically savvy managers can stack their lineups against Willis to take advantage of his weakness against righties. Chances of him rebounding are possible given his age, but the complexity of his windup and his moving to the better league present severe obstacles.

Andrew Miller - Miller is a top-notch pitching prospect who excelled in his 2007 stints in the minors. Miller had no business being in the majors last year, he tore up AA but struggled in his two AAA starts and had less than a year's experience in the Tigers' system. Despite his difficulties at the major league level, he still projects as a mid-to-front end of the rotation starter who is probably a year away from being an impact player.

Cameron Maybin - Maybin had played in six AA games when the Tigers gave him the starting job after they gave Craig Monroe to the Cubs. Another highly talented player who's still raw, Maybin has five tools that should be on display two years down the road. To say the Tigers rushed him through the system is an understatement; his value will grow tremendously if given the time to learn the ropes in the minors.

Mike Rabelo - A cheap backup quality catcher with experience working with young arms.

Eulogio De la Cruz - A fireballer who's worked both as a starter and a reliever. He's erratic and lacks a strong secondary pitch but still has a good shot of finding a role as a 7th-inning reliever or even a setup man.

Dallas Trahern - A mediocre sinkerballer who doesn't get a whole lot of strikeouts but keeps the ball on the ground. Chien-Ming Wang is perfecting the art of the one-pitch sinkerballer and while Trahern is not near Wang's quality, the development of a secondary pitch should let him sneak into the rotation at some point.

Burke Badenhop - Badenhop has dominated A ball and made three impressive starts in AA last year but at the age of 24 and a fastball that barely hits 91 mph his chances are limited. He's still been pitching as a starter, so the conversion to a reliever may allow for him to crack a major league roster eventually.

The Marlins got good value for Miggy and Willis: Two A-quality prospects, two B-quality prospects, a backup catcher, and an additional minor league arm. Presuming the Marlins are patient with Miller and Maybin, they should get a strong return on their investment.

The Tigers now hold one of the most potent offenses in the majors but are taking a big risk on Willis. While Cabrera's and Willis' ages make this deal not a simple future-for-present success swap, it's clear this organization is going to do all it can to win with its current crew--especially after their embarrassing loss in the World Series two years ago.

I'd feel comfortable making this deal from either end, though I think given Willis' level of risk, I would've preferred to have made this deal without having to give up more to include him. Then again, the Marlins may very well have been offering him at a discount rate given the growing speculations about his abilities. The Tigers immediately become a power-house in the AL while the Marlins have set themselves up for another World Series run two or three years down the road.

Dodgers Waste $ Again

Hey, readers. We're back again after a long extended absence. Jeremiah and I are gonna try and be more casual with our posts and post more often. Additionally we want you guys to contribute too. Please feel free to comment on anything in the posts or introduce something totally different.

That being said... the Dodgers organization just got hosed. For the second time in the past three years the Dodgers overpaid for a player that they didn't even need. The Dodgers took enough flak for the Pierre signing (so we'll spare them any more), but the Jones' one may be worse.

Let's first address why Andruw Jones doesn't deserve $18 million. He may only be 30 years old, but he's well beyond his hitting prime. Jones' is an all-or-nothing hitter who consistently strikeouts over 120 times and fails to maintain a decent average. He's a career .263 hitter who doesn't draw walks to compensate for his strikeouts (only once in the last five seasons has he eclipsed a .350 OBP) and hasn't been a threat on the bases for over half a decade. His pitiful .222/.311/.413 season is reminiscent of Jeromy Burnitz' despicable 2002 season for the Mets (.215/.311/.365).

While some may balk and my comparison of these two outfielders, their hitting styles and career paths are very much aligned (Burnitz hit rock bottom at age 33, Jones at 30). The swing-hard and hope for the best mentality quickly led to Burnitz' demise and casts a bleak picture of Jones' offensive future.

Here's where someone feeds me the argument that Jones is an 11-time Gold Glove winner and an excellent outfielder. Jones' defensive prowess has been declining since 1999, to the point where he barely retains the title as an "above average" center fielder. Check his Runs above replacement or average players (RAR and RAA). Both have been dropping drastically since 1999, with Jones being the exact equivalent of an average center fielder in 2006.

Defensive statistics are still highly debatable, but despite this qualm Jones fails to be worth $18 million a year.

The second major reason for why this signing is unwarranted is the Dodgers' proficient amount of young outfield talent. With Pierre now locked in center and Luis Gonzalez becoming a free agent, Andre Ethier and Matt Kemp were projected to be the two corner outfielders for the Dodgers. Each is still on their basic pre-arbitration contracts and each were productive in their sophomore seasons. Jones' presence will take more AB's away from these young hitters without adding any significant production beyond what Ethier and Kemp were providing. Unless the Dodgers are able to turn Ethier for some quality prospects or players (and even then, you're paying Jones $17.5 million more than you would be Ethier) this signing makes no sense given the team's depth chart.

Don't be surprised to see more overspending in the coming weeks. In certain circumstances, it's alright to overpay if your needs are great enough (ie: the White Sox' need for a CF), but in the Dodgers' case, this decision is just inexcusable.

Similarity Scores, continued

After some frustration with my attempts to use Similarity Scores as a prospect rating system, I have decided to try and take a closer look at some of the top prospects' most comparable players.

Although I will try and post more player comparisons in the coming weeks, let's throw out a few intriguing comparables.

Kevin Durant (pace-adjusted, per 32 statistics follow)

Durant: 26.4 ppg, 11.4 rpg, 1.3 apg, .473 FG, .404 3P
Keith Van Horn: 26.5 ppg, 11.4 rpg, 1.7 apg, .492 FG, .387 3P

An astute reader wrote in to Bill Simmons calling Durant the next Van Horn, and on the surface, those fears seem to be realized. Both are skinny 6'10" scoring forwards with 3-point range and eerily similar college numbers. Van Horn went on from this senior season to post a 15.7 PER as a rookie, following it what would be a career high PER of 19.6 in his second season. Although a good offensive player, Durant would be a big disappointment if his peak was Keith Van Horn.

Here are some more stats:
Durant: 1.9 stlspg, 2.0blkspg, 18 years of age
Van Horn: 0.8 stlspg, 1.4blkspg, 21 years of age

Now we see why Durant has more potential. Durant was able to accumulate far more steals and blocks, suggesting that he is the greater athlete and likely the better defender. Most importantly, Durant is three years younger than Van Horn when he entered the draft. Although there are some players who never develop after age 19 (and Van Horn might be one of them), this is rare. The fact is, had Durant spent three more years in college, we might expect his numbers to dwarf Van Horn's. In terms of projecting Durant's playing career, this is quite tantalizing. Instead of saying that Durant's peak will match Van Horn's, we can now see that a slightly more athletic version of Van Horn is probably the worst-case scenario for Durant's career. This is a strong way of suggesting that Durant will easily post PERs in the mid-20s, and should be able to surpass Van Horn's rookie mark of 16.5.

Al Horford

Horford: 18.1 ppg, 13.0 rpg, .608 FG, 3.0 apg, 2.5 blkspg
Elton Brand: 20.3 ppg, 11.2 rpg, .620 FG, 1.2 apg, 2.5 blkspg
Zach Randolph: 20.8 ppg, 12.9 rpg, .587 FG, 2.0 apg, 1.3blkspg
Carlos Boozer: 21.3 ppg, 10.1 rpg, .665 FG, 1.3 apg, 0.7 blkspg

First off, I don't even want to think about how a 20-10 guy shooting 67% from the field dropped to the 2nd round. Secondly, it should be clear that Horford's college numbers hold up pretty well to those of the top power forwards in the NBA today. Although slightly weaker as a scorer, Horford's numbers are excellent in every respect. If he winds up as a better player than Zach Randolph, and I think he will, he was certainly worth the #3 pick.

A disclosure:

Michael Bradley: 22.0 ppg, 10.3 rpg, .692 FG, 2.8 apg, 1.9 blkspg

Bradley, a first-round pick in 2001, only had one season in the NBA where he played more than 500 minutes and is currently out of the league. He was drafted two spots ahead of Zach Randolph. Honestly, I can't say what was wrong with Bradley, and until I find out, there is an inherent amount of estimation in this process. Nonetheless, as a #3 pick in a deep draft, Horford is one of those players where the stats and scouts agree, and that's the best recommendation I can give.

Similarity Scores

On the eve of the 2007 NBA Draft, I have elected to reveal the beginnings of my Similarity Scores project. Admittedly, this is not an entirely new development. In fact, I have taken cues from previous articles such as this one. However, a new year brings new information and as far as I know, no one has projected similarity scores for this year's draft.

A little background: Similarity Scores are a method introduced by Bill James in baseball to get an overall sense of where a player's development is heading. The theory behind it is that similar types of players will develop in similar types of ways. In basketball, we are much more excited about a shot-blocking center than a short point guard who can't create his own shot. Similarity scores compare draft prospects to past draftees in order to see which players they statistically most resemble.

I have intentionally limited the categories across which I make comparisons. I have tried numerous combinations, and different weightings, and have been pleased to see that generally similar results are yielded as long as height, weight, and age provide the baseline. My categories are height, weight, age, John Hollinger's pure point rating (an upgrade over assist/turnover ratio), Rebounds/40 minutes, steals/personal foul, blocks/personal foul, and three-point efficiency. The reason these categories have been chosen over more obvious ones like scoring rate and shooting percentages is because except in extreme cases, scoring rate and shooting percentages generally show very little correlation from the college to the NBA level.

Now, the results! For each player, I list his number of comparable players over 800 - this number is very small in some cases, but close to 40 in other cases. I chose to weight it this way rather than have 5 comps for some players and 150 for others. I then list the average rating of the player's top 10 comps, or all comps over 800 for that player, whichever is greater. NBA players are rated on a simple 1-5 scale: 1 is a bust, 3 a starter, 5 a superstar. (NBA players drafted between 1991 and 2003 are included as 'comps' in this project)

First, potential stars:

Greg Oden
Comps: 3
Avg. Rating: 2.4
Similar to: Tim Duncan, Chris Mihm, Joel Przybilla

Oden's average comp rating is only 2.4, halfway between a bench player and a starter. Although this rating is good by normal standards, I fully expect Oden to be a star in this league and a possible championship centerpiece. I don't put a lot of stock in these results because there simply aren't many good centers who have been drafted in the last 15 years. Tim Duncan shows up as his 5th best comp, which is promising, but with only 3 comps over 800, there aren't a lot of conclusions to draw anyways.

Kevin Durant
Comps: 0
Avg. Rating: 3.9
Similar to: Chris Bosh, Chris Webber, Carmelo Anthony

At least since 1991, there hasn't really been anyone like Durant. No freshman has dominated the NCAA like he did in quite a long time. The system comes up with a lot of young forwards who went on to be stars in the NBA, which is a good sign - but Durant may surpass them all.

Mike Conley, Jr.
Comps: 0
Avg. Rating: 3.1
Similar to: Jason Kidd, Mike Bibby, Allen Iverson

Again, there aren't many players truly similar to Conley, who combined an excellent pure point rating with a fantastic steals/pf ratio, all as a true freshman PG. His closest comparable players are strong ones, and like Durant, it is his uniqueness that suggests future stardom.

Brandan Wright
Comps: 0
Avg. Rating: 3.2
Similar to: Chris Webber, Joe Smith, Rasheed Wallace

Another strong freshman talent, his comps all grew up to be gifted offensive forwards in the NBA. He may not have the desire to be transcendent, but he has all the talent to average 20+ points within 3 years.

Al Horford
Comps: 3
Avg. Rating: 2.6
Similar to: Carlos Boozer, Rasheed Wallace, Lorenzen Wright

Horford is where the system stops projecting stardom for players, but I still think he'll be fine. Although it would be a disappointment if he turned into Lorenzen Wright, his comps mostly include solid NBA forwards, and I suspect he'll fall somewhere in between Wright and Boozer in terms of NBA success.

Corey Brewer
Comps: 19
Avg. Rating: 2.26
Similar to: Michael Finley, Latrell Sprewell, Bob Sura

Although I initially was sour on Brewer using this system, I now think he might have a lot of potential. It is probably underrating him, if anything, because it doesn't really pick up on his defensive potential. Moreover, despite my questions about his offense, players like Rip Hamilton and Jim Jackson also show up on his comp list. This suggests it is not unreasonable to expect him to develop an offensive game that will complement his defensive strengths and turn him into a possible All-Star.

Question Marks:

Here are some players who my system is not as high on. A lot of these players have tons of good comps, which suggests their skills are hardly unique, suggesting they are more fit to be bench players in the NBA.

Al Thornton
Comps: 14
Avg. Rating: 1.86
Similar to: Chris Mills, Ruben Patterson, Bryon Russell

Thornton is 23 and better be ready to make an immediate impact. There are zero top-level starters and stars among his 14 comps, suggesting that at best, he will be a solid starter, and possibly just a reliable bench player. This isn't all bad, but it means he lacks the clear upside of a Thaddeus Young.

Nick Young
Comps: 24
Avg. Rating: 1.8
Similar to: Steve Smith, Jalen Rose, Bryant Stith

Although his top 3 comps include Calbert Cheaney and Steve Smith, suggesting he does have some potential to stick in the league, the majority of his comparable players were wash-outs. Dahntay Jones, Lavor Postell, Michael Dickerson, Ed Gray, etc etc. Young is going to have to be a dead-eye shooter because his game doesn't bring much else to the table.

Jason Smith
Comps: 37
Avg. Rating: 1.89
Similar to: Bison Dele, Mark Blount, Francisco Elson

Smith, besides meeting the dreaded stereotype of a big white stiff playing in a small conference, also does not yield a list of promising comps. Many players were similar to him, and the majority of them simply weren't any good. I don't really see Smith bucking the trend.

Warren Carter
Comps: 31
Avg. Rating: 1.55
Similar to: Brian Cook, Roshown McLeod, Brian Scalabrine

Sorry, Warren.

Acie Law IV
Comps: 9
Avg. Rating: 1.7
Similar to: Jason Hart, Kirk Hinrich, Alvin Williams

Although I admire Law's hart, he's a tweener, and most of his comps turned out pretty badly. However, it is worth remembering that similarity scores provide a picture, not the whole story. Although these numbers suggest Law has a lot of bust potential, if some scouts are correct, he could also become a tougher version of Kirk Hinrich, and that wouldn't be all bad.

Solid players:

Joakim Noah
Comps: 14
Avg. Rating: 2.36
Similar to: P.J. Brown, Kenyon Martin, David West

Rodney Stuckey
Comps: 22
Avg. Rating: 2.18
Similar to: Steve Francis, Aaron McKie, Latrell Sprewell

Jeff Green
Comps: 5
Avg. Rating: 2.40
Similar to: Richard Jefferson, Lamar Odom, Jason Richardson

Julian Wright
Comps: 3
Avg. Rating: 2.60
Similar to: Antawn Jamison, Jerry Stackhouse, Rasheed Wallace

Spencer Hawes
Comps: 3
Avg. Rating: 2.30
Similar to: Tony Battie, Rasheed Wallace, Lorenzen Wright

NBA Mock Draft

Welcome back to those who were with Jeremiah and I (and technically Jim) when we started this blog. We apologize for the extended break (second semester was...how shall we say...not as easy going as the first).

Anyway, with the Simmons and Ford Mock Draft recently completed on ESPN, Jeremiah and I decided to do our own. I drew the odd picks so I'll include commentary for the picks made by myself (and possibly some on Jeremiah's choices for the even number picks). He'll post later tonight about his thought process for some of these picks.

Without further introduction:
1. Portland - Kevin Durant
H: I'm in the camp of believing that Durant is a far better pick for Portland the Oden, but to the point where I'm placing him on a pedestal far beyond the other picks (ala Bill Simmons). If Portland took Oden immediately there's an alpha-dog battle at the 4/5 spots and there'd be a push, as there already is, to move Zach Randolph. As their desparation to move as increased his trade valued has declined and will continue to do so upon Portland solidifying their pick. So the choice is really Durant + Randolph > Oden + .66*Randolph because after the draft they're not getting full market value. I can easily see people's argument for Oden and I really think Portland can't go wrong, just in my opinion (IMO) they'd be better off w/Durant.

2. Seattle - Greg Oden
J: I finally settled for Oden after Hugh said I couldn't take Rich McBride. Excuse me for being a loyal Illini fan.

3. Atlanta - Mike Conley Jr.
H: Another controversial pick on my behalf but this one I feel much more strongly about. Statistical projections are lowering Law's predicted value combining that w/the fact that he's not as true of a point guard as Conley, I don't think the Hawks can pass here. I know this move probably leaves them without a big man at #11, but considering their array of young talent and their financial flexibility, it won't be hard for them to reconfigure their lineup if they don't Noah or Hawes later.

4. Memphis - Al Horford
H: Jeremiah and have long been on the Horford bandwagon before there was one, always believing him to be the best big man available after Oden.

J: Yep, although I don't think Horford will be quite as good as a Zach Randolph or Elton Brand, I still see him as an 18 and 10 kind of player in the NBA.

5. Boston - Joakim Noah
H: Wright doesn't work because you have Jefferson (and both are true PF's not big enough to play C), Yi doesn't work for a truckload of reasons (I'll write a post-draft article about how I believe he's going to be a bust), and J. Green has gotten some discussion but the Celtics already have G. Green and Wally at SF in addition to Pierce who occasionally slides in their. Noah fits talent-wise, need-wise, and personality-wise because he may be the only guy in this draft available at the five capable of convincing Pierce to stay (I wanna see Pierce whine about his supporting cast when Noah's out their busting his ass for 35+ minutes a night).

6. Milwaukee - Brandan Wright

J: There are legitimate questions about Wright regarding his desire and work ethic. Fair enough, but the man did post a fairly impressive freshman campaign (and would be seen if more impressive, if not for the post-Durantian world in which we walk today). He shot 65% from the floor, and at worst, should be a talented offensive big man along the lines of a Chris Bosh. Probably not a star, but a starter.

7. Minnesota - Jeff Green
H: Top-quality player fits into the roster nicely and his hesitancy to declare for the draft shouldn't be an issue with little pressure on him. The team will move Garnett, pick up a young package with picks and set themselves up nicely for a rebuilding stage (hell, if they play their draft cards right they may be able to rope in Hibbert next year).

8. Charlotte - Julian Wright
H: I jokingly offered Boris Diaw (on behalf of the suns) to Jeremiah for this pick, not realizing that a deal based around those two pieces actually make a lot of sense. Wright had been falling on many draft boards but Jeremiah jumped on him here, I have no major qualms w/this pick so I'll let Jeremiah defend it if he feels it necessary.

J: In my eyes, Julian Wright is a better version of Diaw, so I couldn't take that trade. Wright is never going to be a big scorer, but I think he has the versatile game that will allow him to be a valuable piece in a contending team.

9. Chicago - Spencer Hawes
H: I inadvertently hurt Jeremiah's bulls by snatching Noah early. I cringed at being now forced into taking Hawes or Yi (both of whom I dislike immensely). In the end I chose Hawes simply because Chicago needs a big man desperately and I don't see T. Young making it as a PF (I think he'll be a hell of a SF though).

J: Well, I do think Hawes has some upside, if only because of his age.

10. Sacramento - Thaddeus Young
H: This guy started so low on my board but I swear climbs a pick higher every time I go back and look at him. Sacramento could go in a lot of different directions with this pick but I think they needed to go young (ie: Not Thornton). They're gonna need to start rebuilding over the next couple years so I like them picking a player with high upside.

J: Thad Young, however, is much more intriguing to me than Hawes. He certainly did not prove himself to be a great one last season, but again, the heroics of Durant and Conley are completely atypical. Young is still far ahead of the curve for his age, although it is a risk to bet on his development.

11. Atlanta - Al Thornton
H: No doubt Atlanta would shit their pants if Yi fell to this spot, but he's the worst choice for a team like Atlanta or Boston who don't need a project. Thornton gives them an immediate impact and a roster that can easily make a run at the East playoffs in 2008.

12. Philadelphia - Corey Brewer
H: I've seen this guy land anywhere from the late teens to the top-5 in mock drafts but never has he landed in Philly's hands. Actually, I think this may be a nice fit for him. Considering the flak he's been taking, if he falters in Philadelphia it may go more unnoticed considering they are mid-rebuilding phase and the plethora of picks they have make it more likely they'll add at least on strong piece to their roster.

J: My similarity scores method (still in the works) suggests Corey Brewer will be a good, but not great player. I'd say he's definitely not a top 5 pick, because he's never going to average 20 a night (probably not even 15), and I'm concerned about his low block rate for such a supposedly great defender. Brewer could even fall flat on his face and bust, which is not what you want that high up in the draft. That said, I think he could be nearly as good a defender as a Bruce Bowen with a more diverse offensive game.

13. New Orleans - Nick Young
H: The first easy pick I get. Young's been falling in many people's eyes (mine included), but NO needs an SG and Young is still the best on the board.

J: There have been a lot of players with similar college numbers to Nick Young, and most of them sucked. I remain skeptical.

14. Los Angeles (Clipppers) - Javaris Crittenton
H: As mentioned before, Law's stock rose significantly post-tournament but has fallen of late. I don't see him getting past the Clippers but I'll let Jeremiah make his argument before I start ragging on any of his decisions.

J: I'll let you read more about Law when one of us picks him, but I think Crittenton has a lot more potential as a pure point. If not for his high turnover rate, he could already be as highly regarded as Mike Conley. A definite risk, but not a huge one.

15. Detroit Pistons - Rodney Stuckey
H: If Law falls to them, the Pistons very well by opt for him, but considering they've been so infatuated with Stuckey, I really didn't want to throw a huge wrench in the order and just opted for Stuckey. Frankly, the Pistons could go in a variety of directions and I'm comfortable with their expected choice.

16. Washington - Rudy Fernandez
H: I absolutely love this kid and if the Suns manage to get a higher pick but not within the lottery I hope they aim for Rudy. He's more of a catch and shoot guy who plays better off the ball (hence why I want him in Phoenix) so he won't detract from Arenas' ball-handling time and allows them to further spread the floor.

J: I just want to say that Fernandez's Euroleague numbers are so much better than Marco Belinelli's that I just don't see how they can be in the same tier.

17. New Jersey - Sean Williams
H: Marcus Williams feel to us last year because of off-court questions last year and no issues arose. Why not test fate again? I feel with the 17th pick you might as well take a gamble on a guy who could be a dominant defender (and provide more offense than Jason Collins) and work hard to ensure he stays focused. Who's gonna lead this guy astray anyway? Bostjan Nachbar?

18. Golden State - Yi Jianlian
H: I knew Jeremiah would be the one to pick this guy and this match actually makes a ton of sense (they've been coveting him for awhile now). I really hope this scenario happens because I can't imagine another peculiar character joining that rambunctious group. With Yi on the team how can they not make a sitcom out of this? Seriously, how could you not watch Stephen Jackson calling out Yi for not being tough enough in the paint followed by Yi being consoled by Biedrins who undoubtedly got yelled at some point for his absurdly inaccurate foul shooting technique? I'd buy HBO just to watch that show.

J: I actually think we waited way too long on Yi, but I wanted him to go to Golden State. Even if we think Yi is more likely to be a bust, he has too much upside to fall this far.

19. Los Angeles (Lakers) - Josh McRoberts
H: I originally thought of taking Jason Smith but quickly rescinded upon realizing that a guy from Colorado St. is not the best guy to be throwing into the media mess and soap opera that is the Lakers. McRoberts fills a similar need while be far more prepared for the hype considering his experience at Duke. This pick officially allows the Lakers to dangle Kwame's expiring contract as trade bait to try and satisfy Kobe (if he's still there).

20. Miami - Acie Law IV
H: Law fell awfully far in our draft but I think Miami may be a good fit for him. With the Heat slowly pushing J. Williams out the door, this pseudo-PG fills that growing need. It'll be interesting to see how Law and Wade, both combo guards capable of playing at the 1 but are better at the 2, play together when on the court at the same time. Wade's presence may also be a helping factor in allowing Law to tap into that "we're not fucking losing this game" mentality Law exhibited intermittently throughout the NCAA season.

J: Here's my problem: Bill Simmons argues for Acie Law on the basis of his ability to take over games in crunch-time. Regardless of whether you think this is an actual skill, clutch performance is usually irrelevant when drafting, a secondary concern at best. Why? Because we still haven't mastered the art of figuring out which players are going to be any good. My problem with Law is that he's a tweener, stuck between positions, and players that were similar to him in the past didn't turn out very well.

21. Philadelphia - Jason Smith
H: Now I'm forced to choose for a team that really has indicated no directional signs in terms of their desires for this draft. I almost went with Cook, but realized that they Jeremiah had already chosen Brewer for them earlier. Then I tried naming a big man on Philly other than Dalembert. I failed to without resorting to looking online (if you can, then serious props to you) and upon seeing the answer I quickly decided in favor of Smith.

22. Charlotte - Tiago Splitter
H: I have a fear of foreign big men with rebounding, strength, and aggressiveness deficiencies but Jeremiah opted for him claiming that it was his "i have no idea" pick.

J: He had to go sometime.

23. New York - Wilson Chandler*
H: *I opted to switch picks with Jeremiah, making him choose for the Knicks to allow me to pick for the Suns. The Knicks need a new GM really, but Chandler will be a nice addition anyway.

J: Wilson Chandler has mysteriously risen up draft boards of late despite little college hype, but I was surprised to see that he ranks well using similarity scores. I'll admit to not knowing a whole lot about him, but he seems worth a late 1st-round pick to me.

24. Phoenix Suns - Nick Fazekas*
H: I have been coveting this guy since day 1. A big guy who rebounds well and can shoot the three, isn't that precisely what the Suns need? Does nobody remember how perfectly Tim Thomas fit into the Suns rotation? Ehhhh, I can keep dreaming cause the odds of this pick happening wouldn't even be posted in Vegas. Phoenix fears the luxury tax like a soon to be bride fears calories, but they need to just suck it up and take a gamble on the vanilla frosted cupcake. I'm making myself hungry with this ongoing analogy.

25. Utah - Morris Almond
H: I actually have this guy ranked a lot higher on my board, but his true shooter style fits perfectly with the Jazz who need a scoring threat for Deron Williams to dish to. Almond may have trouble adjusting to a secondary role (he was the central figure on Rice's team) but as witnessed in Phoenix, it's hard to be mad when you're winning and have a great point guard getting you easy shots (I'm not saying Deron Williams is going to be the next Steve Nash, but hey, he looked awfully good down the stretch last year).

26. Houston - Glen Davis
H: Fazekas having been swiped, Davis fills Houston's need in the paint. This match may set up yet another great storyline, especially if Davis plays C as opposed to PF. Imagine Davis (6'9") coming off the bench for Yao (7'6") yet there's less than a 20lbs difference. How does this not completely throw off the other team's tactics on offense and defense? Furthermore, maybe Yao's borderline obsessive work ethic rubs off on Davis and he becomes even more athletic (I have to admit he moves pretty smoothly for a fat guy).

J: Glen Davis might just wind up getting too fat, but I see him making an immediate impact as a rookie. That takes him out of the second round, but his limited development potential keeps him in the late first.

27. Detroit - Marco Belinelli
H: With Weber leaving and McDyess one year older (also only one year left on his contract) a big man would probably be the best option. With Davis gone though (who doesn't really fit their system anyway) they'd really have to reach if they wanted front court help. I know people are pushing Byars or possibly even Green, but I couldn't possibly pass up the chance to see Detroit have yet another foreign player possibly implode. Yea, I'm a spiteful bitch who may have stopped taking this draft seriously at this point, but I'm still happy with my decision.

28. San Antonio - Jared Dudley
H: Another player who I think is underrated because I love his intangibles (hence my fondness for Noah, Law, etc.). I would love to see him land in the Suns' lap but the Spurs are a great fit for him. He may just be the next Bruce Bowen, which makes the Spurs even scarier considering the financial flexibility they can after next season.

J: I see him as a definite contributor. The Spurs really only need bench players, and Dudley will be a good one.

29. Phoenix - Petteri Koponen
H: A.) The Suns can keep him overseas if they don't think he's ready and avoid payroll issues. B.) He provides a young protege for Nash who's not named Marcus Banks and can actually shoot ::cough:: Taurean Green :: cough:: C.) He plays for a team called the Playboys! C'mon, that's gotta be reason enough. (Side Note: I'm hoping the Suns grab Jared Jordan in the second round as a plan B for Koponen)

30. Philadelphia - Warren Carter (not really, but Jeremiah insists)
H: A joke pick that can easily be supplemented with one of the numerous guard options available. A PG like Pruit, Green, or Sessions would be good here and allow them to work their way into the rotation behind Andre Miller before taking the reigns in a year or two.

J: I'm insulted that this would be labeled a joke. Carter is a rangy forward with 3-point range and decent athleticism. Like Kevin Durant without a feel for the game.

Final Thoughts:
I'm pretty happy with the result. Clearly the real draft will not resemble this at all, but I feel like Jeremiah and were able to mesh and convey our personal opinions on the skills and needs of the players and teams in this draft. I promise a future rant about my abhorring of Yi Jianlian and will be happy to discuss any questions or comments that you may have. Enjoy the draft!

NBA Skill Set: What Really Matters

We’re not crashing the boards! You’ve got to take better care of the ball! We’re letting them take too many wide open shots! All NBA fans and especially those who’ve ever played for a team—whether it be in college, middle school or whatever—have heard these words of advice screamed before. Coaches aren’t stupid, they can see when their team’s being beat in a specific aspect of a game and need to make adjustments. But which are the most important?

If you’re team’s not rebounding well, but at the same time not covering the perimeter shooters how should they adjust? A 2-3 zone to protect the boards but remain limited around the arc or a 3-2 zone to shut down the long range shooters but abdicate more offensive rebounds? Screw it, they should probably just play man-to-man, but still the question lingers.

In order to feed my statistical curiosity I conducted a quick study of all NBA teams in the previous six seasons. Taking team statistical data from both espn.com and basketball-reference.com I ran a regression to determine which skills (as a team) played the most important roles in determining the outcome of a game.

My first regression used the five more essential statistics (at least in my mind) for a basketball squad to predict my dependent variable: team’s winning percentage. The five independent variables were: FG%, Opp. FG%, D-Rebounds, O-Rebounds, and Assist/Turnover Ratio. These statistics measure a team’s ability to shoot well, prevent their opponents from shooting well, rebound on both ends of the court, and handle the ball both carefully and effectively. I altered these statistics slightly though, relying on adjusted field goal percentage for both the team in question and their opponents. Also instead of using the team’s average rebounds per game, which can be inflated or deflated depending on the number of shots taken and made by both teams, I used the percentage of offensive and defensive rebounds that a team pulled down with respect to every shot taken. A-T Ratio remained untouched.

Results were promising, generating a healthy 0.678 adjusted R-squared value and all the coefficients were significant and had the right sign. Here are their t-scores (the larger the absolute value, the greater that variables importance to the regression):
Adjusted FG% = 11.52385
Opponents’ Adjusted FG% = -8.005760
D-Rebound % = 4.384378
O-Rebound % = 3.763958
Assist/Turnover Ratio = 5.768974

These results are promising with a team’s overall shooting ability reigning supreme. Considering the strong t-scores from all these variables I decided to throw in three more variables that would complement the current skill set: Blocks, Steals, and Free Throw %. These traits I felt were less essential to a team’s overall success but were still admirable qualities that would improve a team’s chances of winning.

My second and more crowded regression was equally satisfying with all the previous variables and the newly added ones emerging significant and with signs corresponding to what we would assume in theory. Here are the t-scores for the second regression listed in descending order (and importance):
Adjusted FG% = 12.93219
D-Rebound % = 6.807323
Steals = 6.211744
Opponents’ Adjusted FG% = -6.184397
Assist/Turnover Ratio = 4.719551
Blocks = 3.177327
O-Rebound % = 3.082311
Free Throw % = 2.190980

There are some peculiar happenings in this regression compared to the previous one. The most astonishing change is D-Rebound’s leap frogging ahead of Opp. FG% which dropped to a surprising 4th place. Steals is awfully high on this scale, or at least much higher than I had anticipated. FT% and Blocks drift towards the bottom as suspected, but O-Rebounds lies fairly low as well. A possible reason for this is that a team who concerns itself with transition defense rather than recklessly going for offensive boards may be able to succeed adequately and therefore make O-Rebounds less essential.

The only other qualm I have is Adjusted FG %’s dominance over all other variables. I did expect it to be the most important variable, but twice as important as the next most critical statistic? Well, it at the very least signifies that it is very hard to compensate for poor shooting by heightening other aspects of your team’s game.

I ran the same regressions as mentioned above but with the team's expected winning percentage (generated via their points scored and allowed) as the dependent variable and found similar results. The adjusted R-squared value was slightly higher and each variable’s t-score increased by a varying margin. Actually it regressed back to my original expectations with Opp. FG % retaking the #2 slot with steals dropping to 4th. Also to my liking, offensive rebounds climbed above blocks. Here are the tallies:
Adjusted FG% = 14.48154
Opponents’ Adjusted FG% = -7.502249
D-Rebound % = 7.297942
Steals = 6.881690
Assist/Turnover Ratio = 4.743004
O-Rebound % = 3.613866
Blocks = 3.230449
Free Throw % = 2.470133

I was interested in seeing how these skills manifested themselves throughout the playoff atmosphere but found myself with a conundrum: there is no system for measuring playoff success (or at least none that I am aware of). WPCT in the playoffs is not apt because of the small sample size and each team does not play the same number of games. The number of wins is also incapable of determining the dominance of a team because it doesn't account for how many times they lost en route to their final ranking. I tried developing a point system for wins and losses but it was purely by trial and error and lacked aesthetic qualities. If anyone is aware of or can derive a system of rating a team's playoff performances (other than laundry listing every possible scenario in a ranked order) please bring it to my attention, as it could be implemented not only in this study but in another one I am working on.

As for this study, I am quite satisfied with the simple, yet useful findings. Sadly basketball is a far more fluid game than baseball so it is very difficult to quantify the cohesiveness of a team and how they interact together. We've all learned from Isiah Johnson that a real basketball team is not just a collection of numbers. Therefore it's hard to draw any further conclusions as to how a team should focus itself on the court or how one should be put together. That's not to say there aren't more inferences that can be made from these results, but we must remind ourselves of its limitations.

Feel free to draw your own conclusions—I’d greatly appreciate any feedback you may have—but remember that this regression is only representative of games played in the past six seasons. Do not use these results as indications that previous notions and standards for how to play the game were in fact wrong; rather they merely represent a shift in how the game is played today. If you have any questions, comments, or would simply like a copy of the data used to run the regression you can post a comment here or contact me via e-mail.